Over the past six months, Serbia has experienced a deepening erosion of its democratic order, further distancing the country from its aspiration of European Union membership, concludes the new prEUgovor Alarm Report for the period May–October 2025.
While mass civic and student protests for accountability, functional institutions, and free and fair elections continue, the state has responded with increasing repression, exposing the systemic weakening of checks and balances. The ruling party has intensified its practice of undermining the constitutional order through the marginalisation of parliament, pressure on civil society, the media, and academia, the misuse of security institutions, and the growing political influence over the judiciary. In key areas - from elections and fundamental rights to the fight against corruption and organised crime - stagnation or backsliding is evident, accompanied by a series of alarming incidents.
New deadlines from the Reform Agenda — as well as older ones from the action plans for Chapters 23 and 24 — have once again passed without results, underscoring the continued lack of political will in Serbia to address chronic problems in democracy and the rule of law. Political compromises on defined priorities are made at the last moment under pressure from the European Union, yet their quality is questionable and their consequences are still to unfold. The drafting of necessary legislation is also delayed, but even more concerning is that the proposed solutions lower existing standards and pave the way for stronger state repression.
Meanwhile, messages coming from Brussels are growing sharper. They are most clearly reflected in the resolutions of the European Parliament, but also in the new European Commission report, the Rule of Law Report on Serbia, and in public statements by EU officials. In the latest enlargement package, Serbia is identified as a captured state, grouped in key areas with Turkey and Georgia at the very bottom of the accession process, while its neighbours Montenegro and Albania have accelerated their progress. The package explicitly states that senior Serbian officials promote an anti-European narrative and that, under such conditions and amid deep societal polarisation, their promise to meet all membership criteria by the end of 2026 is not considered credible. Despite this, the authorities persist in announcing the imminent opening of negotiating Cluster 3, even though there is no substantive progress that would warrant such a decision by the EU Council.
The average ratings of progress over the past year and the overall level of readiness for membership across 33 of the 35 Chapters have remained almost unchanged. In Chapters 23 (Judiciary and Fundamental Rights) and 24 (Justice, Freedom and Security), which are regularly monitored by the prEUgovor Coalition, progress dropped by one point on the scale. For the first time, it has been recorded that there is no progress at all in Chapter 23, and that the state of freedom of expression has regressed.
The prEUgovor Alarm Report on the Progress of Serbia in Cluster 1 is a regular, semi-annual shadow report jointly produced and published by the seven civil society organisations comprising the prEUgovor coalition. The Alarm reports have been the corner-stone of prEUgovor monitoring efforts ever since its inception in 2013, focusing on tracking the progress and performance of the Serbian Government on delivering rule of law related reforms. The prEUgovor Alarm reports focus primarily on the selected policy areas from the Political Criteria, Chapter 23 (Judiciary and Fundamental Rights) and Chapter 24 (Justice, Liberty, Security) of the accession process of the Republic of Serbia to the European Union, i.e. from Cluster 1 in the new enlargement methodology. This is the 25th issue of the prEUgovor Alarm Report.